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Prepared By:
Maushish Yadav
DeFi Security Researcher | Auditor | Founder @Paystream Labs

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Analysis Overview

This report details the results of a static analysis conducted on the Paystream DeFi lending protocol using the tools X-Ray (v0.0.6) and Radar.
Our audit spanned three primary program modules: drift_optimizer, lib, and Paystream-v1.
The primary objective was to identify unsafe patterns, missing validations, and account mismanagement across Solana smart contracts that constitute the core protocol.

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Tooling & Methodology

  • Tools Used: X-Ray v0.0.6, Radar
  • Techniques:
    • IR file analysis
    • Instruction graph traversal
    • Owner/signer validation
    • Unsafe AccountInfo pattern detection
    • Collateral access audits
  • Scope: Drift Optimizer, Core Lending Program, Utility Libraries

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Findings

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Drift Optimizer

  • Vulnerability: Missing owner check on spot_market account
  • Location: get_apys.rs, line 26
  • Risk: Unauthorized account manipulation; deserialization of arbitrary data
  • Mitigation: Add explicit owner validation matching expected protocol program

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Lib Module

  • Vulnerabilities: None
  • Status: All logic modules and dependencies passed pointer and transformation analysis cleanly.

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Core Protocol (Paystream-v1)

  • Total Detected: 33 vulnerabilities
  • Patterns Observed:
    • Repeated absence of signer/owner checks on critical account inputs
    • Unsafe use of unchecked AccountInfo<'info> under CHECK: macros
    • Multiple validator bypass risks in borrow, repay, and withdraw flows

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High-Risk Locations

  • deposit.rs: No signer validation on protocol_vault_authority
  • lend.rs: Improper validation of protocol and vault accounts
  • borrow.rs: Data leakage and injection risks due to unchecked accounts
  • withdraw.rs: Deserialization of collateral_market without secure constraints
  • liquidate_by_ltv.rs: Direct liquidatee access without auth constraints

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Recommendations

  1. Apply .is_signer and .owner == expected_program_id checks across all cross-program and CHECK: inputs
  2. Replace unchecked AccountInfo fields with validated Account or InterfaceAccount where feasible
  3. For all #[account(...)] constraints, enforce explicit runtime assertions
  4. Protect dangerously_mutate_* functions with hardcoded access lists or role-based checks

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Security References

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Conclusion

While Paystream demonstrates significant innovation in on-chain lending and liquidity optimization, security hardening remains crucial before scaling further.
Patching signer and owner validation gaps should be prioritized to mitigate protocol-level risks, particularly around token streaming and borrowing logic.
A formal verification of economic invariants and runtime constraints is recommended before public audits.
Disclaimer: This report is a static report which is very different from a manual audit. This is done for initial security analysis.